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Abstract: The   need to protect database, would be an every growing one especially so in this age of  
e-commerce. Many conventional database security systems are bugged with holes that can be used by 
attackers to penetrate the database. No matter what degree of security is put in place, sensitive data in 
database are still vulnerable to attack. To avoid the risk posed by this threat, database encryption has 
been recommended. However encrypting all of database item will greatly degrade the performance of 
the database system. As an optimal solution this paper presents a database encryption scheme that 
provides maximum security, whilst limiting the added time cost of encryption and decryption. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In today’s economy databases symbolize one of the most 
valuable assets.  They  form the  basis  for e -business, 
e-commerce, Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) and 
other sensitive activities. Many organizations cannot 
work properly if  their  database is  down; they are 
normally referred to as mission-critical system. Along 
with the wide application of databases comes the need 
for its protection. Universally, huge amount of effort, 
time and resources are been spent in trying to make 
database systems meet  security requirements.  These 
security requirements include: 
 
*  Prevention of unauthorized disclosure of 
information 
*  Prevention of unauthorized modification of 
information 
*  Prevent denial of service 
*  Prevent system penetration by unauthorized 
person 
*  Prevent the abuse of special privileges 
 
Designing a database that will  achieve these security 
requirements is very difficult, since a database system 
processes large amount of data in complex ways. The 
result is that most conventional database systems have 
leaks that attacker can use to penetrate the database. No 
matter what degree of security is put in place, sensitive 
data in database are still vulnerable to attack. A remedy 
therefore is to turn to cryptographic means of storing 
data. Encrypting data stored in a database can prevent 
their disclosure to attackers even if they manage to 
circumvent the access control mechanism.  Thus 
cryptographic technique can ensure excellent security 
for databases, by reducing the whole security process 
down to the protection of only few cryptographic keys. 
Nonetheless the time cost involved in encrypting and 
decrypting data items can greatly degrade the 
performance of the database system.  A compromise 
solution must be found between performance a nd 
security, by encrypting only sensitive data in tables or 
column in the database. The objective of this paper is to 
propose a secure database encryptions scheme that 
provides maximum security, whilst limiting the added 
time cost for encryption and decryption. The encryption 
technique considered is Data Encryption Standard 
(DES), but the scheme is  also  applicable to other 
cryptographic techniques and standards.  
[1, 2]  has  contributed immensely to efforts towards 
providing Database Security through Cryptographic 
means. In [1] he provides solutions to the security 
problems of field based protection.  In his paper he 
presents a comparative study on implementing 
encryption at various database levels i.e table, attribute 
and field (element) levels.  In  [2] he tries to solve 
database integrity problem through cryptographic 
checksum. 
[3] proposed a system model using two trusted modules 
(security kernels), and use tags to ensure integrity. [4] 
proposed a blend record and field techniques, based on 
remainder theorem. A ll the above approaches are 
different from  this study in terms of structure, key 
management and the implementation procedures. 
 
MATERIALS AND METHODS 
 
The  proposed scheme adopts a two-level relational 
database  system, wherein  subjects (users) are assigned  
to either of two levels, L 1 (low) and L 2 (high). All 
Subjects have access right to their own personal private 
data (P). And   in     addition,    subjects     in    L1   have 
access    right     only      to     unclassified     (U) public 
data,      whilst     those   in   L2   have   access    right   to  
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Table 1:  Elements of the Model 
Set  Elements  Semantics 
S  {s1, s2, s3,……….., sn}  Subject (Users) 
O  {Aj, Xij} 
i = row ;  j = column  
Database object:  
{Attribute, data} 
L(s) 
 
{L 1,L2} 
L1  <  L2 
Clearance level of subjects  
{low, High} 
L(o) 
 
{[U, C], P} 
U < C < P 
Classification of objects 
{[unclassified,classified], 
private} 
K  {K1, K2, ……, Kr}  Categories: special access 
privileges to sensitive object. 
V  } , , , , , { UPDATE DEL INSERT · p s   Access operations: 
{select, project, join, insert, 
delete, update} 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.1:  General Structure of Model 
 
both unclassified and classified (C) public data. The 
access rights of subjects in L 2  to classified data is 
however limited to their “Need-to-know” sensitive data. 
The elements used in the scheme are defined in Table1 
[5]. T he database objects are classified into public 
[unclassified, classified] and private objects.  
Unclassified Data: are non-sensitive data that forms the 
bulk of the database and are open to all users for access.  
Classified  Data: are sensitive data that has restricted 
access.  Example salary of employees is considered a 
sensitive data not to be disclosed to all subjects. But 
some subjects such as account manager who has 
need-to-know salaries of all employees should be 
granted access privilege to employees’ salary. 
Private Data: are user’s personal secret data like credit 
card number, which should only be available to them or 
for which others need to take direct permission from 
them before access. 
Because database is a collection of related data,  it is 
assumed that classified data are held under the same 
database attributes (column) different from those for 
unclassified data.  Therefore classification for public 
[unclassified, classified] object is done at attribute level, 
whilst private objects are classified at data element level. 
The system structure of the model is shown in Fig. 1. 
Basically the model was divided into three layers: 
The first layer is the user interface layer, which contains 
two blocks, one for level1 subjects and the other for 
level2 subjects. All subjects posses a unique key KP in 
the form of a certificate that they use when accessing 
their encrypted private data in the database. The second 
layer is the database management  layer, which also 
contains two main blocks, one that implements the 
mandatory access control (MAC) to the database, and 
another that houses a tamper-free controller that is 
closely linked with a trusted subject.  
The functions of the controller (KC) are: 
 
*  To generate and safely store two sets of 
encryption keys. K P  for each user’s private 
encrypted data and K j for encrypted classified 
data 
*  To  encrypt classified and private data before 
being storage in the database 
*  To decrypt classified and private data in the American J. Appl. Sci., 1 (4): 327-331,2004 
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response to users queries that satisfied security 
requirements 
*  To perform integrity check on users returned data 
*  To facilitate authentication of users when 
necessary.  
 
The trusted-subject (TS) is in charge of: 
*  Registering new subjects record 
*  Deleting subjects and objects 
*  Declassifying subjects and objects 
*  Updating classified and private data. 
 
The bottom layer contains the database.  In order to 
facilitate fast retrieve of data, the database system stores 
unclassified data in the clear, whilst  classified and 
private data are stored in encrypted form. The first field 
of every record uniquely identifies the record, and serves 
as its primary key (ID). Primary key should not be 
confused with cryptographic keys used to decrypt 
ciphertext. 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Implementation:  It is described that how the model 
operates to provide security to the database.  As 
mentioned earlier classified and private data are stored in 
encrypted form in the database. If an intruder manages to 
circumvent the mandatory access control mechanism 
and penetrate the database, sensitive data are still 
concealed from them as they lack the  necessary 
decryption keys.  This provides confidentiality to 
sensitive data stored in the database.  
To control user’s access to information in the database, 
the MAC maintains an authorized view of the database 
for all subjects. As the labeling of public (unclassified 
and classified) objects  is at the attribute level, the 
maximum authorized view of a subject to a relation R in 
the database is defined as follows: 
Let L (Ai) denotes the classification of attribute Ai in the 
relation R. The set of attributes authorized to subject ‘s’ 
with clearance L(s) is defined by:  
)} ( ) ( | { ) ( . s L A L R A s auth A i i £ ˛ =  
Thus the maximal authorize view of s on R is:  
). ( ) ( _ . ) ( . R R VIEW MAX s s auth A p =  
This implies that any query Qi from a subject has to be 
augmented to a  secure form Q sec  that reflects the 
authorized view of the subject. As an example let us 
consider three classes of increasingly complex queries: 
select, select-project, and select-project-join. 
Select Query: For a query Q1 = SELECT all (records) 
from R (relation) WHERE (constrained by) F. 
). ( 1 R Q F s =  
The secure version of Q 1 becomes 
)). ( ( ) ( . 1 . sec R Q s auth A F p s =  
Select-Project Query:  For a query Q 2 = SELECT all 
records from R WHERE F, and PROJECT on attribute 
set A. 
)). ( ( 2 R Q F A s p =  
And the secure version of Q 2 is 
))). ( ( ( ) ( . 2 . sec R Q s auth A F A p s p =  
Select-Project-Join Query: For a query Q 3 that joins 
two sub queries Qa and Qb, where:  
)). ( ( a F A a R Q
a s p =  
)). ( ( b F A b R Q
b s p =  
Then  )). ( ( , 3 b a F A R A R R R Q
B B a a · = s p  
And the secure version is 
))). ( ) ( ( ( ) ( . ) ( . , 3 . sec b s auth A a s auth A F A R A R R R Q
B a b B a a p p s p · =
 
In general, for all users query to the database, MAC 
takes as input
 [6]: 
 
*  User’s ID 
*  User’s clearance L(s) 
*  User’s query Qi 
*  D, a set of constraints that prevent users from 
making direct modifications to data and classes of 
subjects and objects. 
If no security violation is detected, MAC provides an 
answer in responds to Qi.  
To maintain the integrity of the database, subjects are 
constrained from  carrying out direct access operations 
that may  change the state of the database.  Such 
operations include Create, Update, Delete, and change of 
Classification. Request for such operations should be 
forward to the trusted subject who evaluates them with 
respect to security violations and if safe allows their 
execution. Further more the enciphered text also serves 
as checksum against which returned sensitive data are 
crosschecked. The restriction on the subjects can be 
implemented using the following two constraints 
Constraint 1: For all , S s˛ If  TS s „ , 
 S* = S, L(s)* = L(s). 
Constraint 2: For all  , O o˛   
If  TS s „  
O* = O American J. Appl. Sci., 1 (4): 327-331,2004 
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L (o)* = L (o)  
Content (o)* = Content (o) 
 
The Star * in front of variables refer to their new state, 
whilst unstared  variables their old state.  Constraint1 
removes the right from all subjects to create other 
subjects or change their clearance level. And constraint 2 
removes the right from subject to directly create new 
object or change the classification or content of objects.   
In our proposed scheme Authentication and verification 
of query originator only applies for access to private data. 
Subjects are required to bind queries for private data 
with their special certification key as discussed below.  
Finally to block inference channels, all functional 
dependent objects (attributes) are made to have the same 
classification label. 
 
Key Management: The security of enciphered sensitive 
data in the database depends on the protection of the 
keys. For this reason, management of keys is vital to the 
overall security of the database system.  Key 
management includes every aspect of the handling of 
keys from their generation to their eventual destruction 
[7].  The proposed scheme makes use of three sets of 
encryption keys Kj, Kp and K for classified data, private 
data and  controller’s master key respectively. Their 
generation and distribution process are as  discussed 
below: 
 
Key Generation:  An ideal method of key generation 
would be one that c hose the key at random. 
Unfortunately, absolute randomness to key generation is 
difficult to  achieve.  A possible source of generating 
random key values is through pseudo-random key 
generators with different seed startup values. This form 
the bases for generating the controller master key K. 
Generation of the other two keys are as follows: 
 
Generation of Classified Data Keys: With classified 
data labeled at attribute level.  Let A j be an attribute 
identifier, and K the controller master key. An attribute 
key to classified data is defined by Kj = g (Aj, K) or Kj = 
EK(Aj), where g is a key generating function. 
 
Generation of Private Data Keys: Users’ private data 
elements should have unique key.  Therefore 
classification for private data is at data element level. It 
is assumed that the first field (ID) in every record 
uniquely identifies the record; i.e, it is the primary key of 
the database. For every private data Xij, the private key is 
defined by: 
 
Kp = g (ID, A j ,T, K) or 
]. ) [( ) ( ) ( T A ID E T K E K E K j K i K t K p ¯ ¯ = ¯ = =  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2a and b:  Hierarchy  Structure for  Generating 
Classified and  Private  Keys, 
respectively  
where, T is time stamp included to ensure that K p is 
unique every time it is updated and  ¯  is the 
exclusive-or operator. Using Data Encryption Standard 
(DES) technique, identifiers are assume to be at most 8 
byte long, and are padded as necessary to fill 8 bytes (Fig. 
2). Also the key generating function is chosen such that 
the probability of getting repeated keys is low and also 
be computationally infeasible to determine one element 
key from other element keys [8]. 
 
Key Distribution: The generated classified and private 
data keys are stored in a tamper free controller. A copy of 
a private data key Kp is sent to the owner of the private 
data as a form of certificate. Request for a private data 
should be accompanied with its certificate for such 
request to be honored.  Subjects can exchange their 
certificate with others who they wish to allow view to 
their private data, and can later request for an update. 
However only a private data owner can request update to 
private data or it certificate.  Thus the controller must 
authenticate the originator for update to private data. In 
general private data keys are refreshed more often than 
classified data keys as they have  greater changes of 
being exposed. 
 
Encryption and Decryption: The classified and private 
data elements X ij are encrypted/decrypted using Data 
Encryption Standard (DES) technique. Where Xij is less 
than the 8-byte block size of DES, X ij is replicated as 
many times as necessary to fill the block. If Xij however 
exceeds the block size, then the encryption is performed 
using cipher block chaining with initialization block [1]. 
Figure 3a and b illustrates the encryption and decryption 
of classified data and private data element, respectively. 
The controller relies greatly on the mandatory access 
control mechanism and trusted subject to control access 
to keys. If response to a user’s secure query includes  
 American J. Appl. Sci., 1 (4): 327-331,2004 
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Fig. 3a and b:  The  Process of  Encryption and 
Decryption of  Classified and  Private 
Data, respectively 
encrypted data, the MAC sends a command to the 
controller to decrypt them before being forwarded to the 
users.  The reverse process is performed when user’s 
query requires storage or update to sensitive data in the 
database.  
One    other    advantage  of     our     proposed   scheme is   
that   the   ciphertext   also   serves   as cryptographic   
checksum   to  protect  against modification    to   data   
and   its   classification   label. This   is   made   possible  
because  short  plaintext  data are  replicated  many  times  
as  necessary  to   fill the encryption  block  size. Thus 
because of this redundancy  the  ciphertext  can  provide  
authenticity as well as secrecy. 
 
Checksum  ) ( ij K ij ij X E C S
j = =  for classified data, 
and  ) ( ij K ij ij X E C S
p = = for private data
 [1]. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This paper investigates the role cryptograph can play in 
database security. In a database system, sensitive data 
stored in the clear can be vulnerable to attack. No matter 
the amount of security measures taken, there would 
always be some security leaks which attackers can use to 
penetrate the database. However, if sensitive data are 
encrypted before storage in the database, the risk from 
security leaks can be eliminated. And the whole database 
security issue can be reduced down to the protection of 
few cryptographic keys.  
The proposed database encryption scheme is considered 
efficient because it provides maximum security to the 
database, whilst the added time cost for encryption and 
decryption is very minimal.  All aspects of security 
concerned from confidentiality, access control, integrity, 
authentication to non-repudiation were addressed. 
Furthermore, the use of authorized view and a tamper 
free  controller solves indirect threats from  inference 
channel, insecure information flow and ciphertext 
searching.  
To reduce the time spent on encryption and decryption, 
the scheme divides the database into sensitive (classified 
and private) and non-sensitive (unclassified) data. 
Non-sensitive data, which forms the bulk of the database, 
are stored in the clear, facilitating their fast retrieval. 
Although classified data (part of the public data) are 
stored in encrypted form, their decryption process is 
very fast, as only one key is needed to decrypt a whole 
column (attribute) of encrypted classified data.  Also, 
although  accessed  encrypted private data has to be 
decrypted separately using their unique keys. Requests 
for private data are very seldom and are carried out only 
once on a while. This makes the time cost for their 
encryption and decryption to have less significance on 
the overall performance of the scheme. 
The only downside side of the scheme is that queries 
such as  sums, averages, counts and other statistical 
functions that aggregate over a range of data in the 
database cannot be performed directly. However users 
themselves at the user interface layer can do such task. 
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